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I.

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of religion and the separation of church and state constitute
ongoing policy concerns in the United States.1 Although the reach of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause is limited in scope,2 stricter establishment
clauses in state constitutions sometimes raise concerns regarding religious
discrimination.3 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley provides an
excellent example of the tension between establishment policy and
discrimination.4 In Trinity, the plaintiff asserted that the denial of a state grant to
the Learning Center at Trinity Church because of its status as a religious
organization constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the right to free speech under the First
Amendment, and Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.5 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the denial of the grant by
a Missouri state agency violated neither the United States Constitution nor the
1

See generally U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (stating that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion”), with MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (mandating that “no money shall ever be
taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of
religion”).
3
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (upholding Washington state law that barred
public aid to a college student seeking a theology degree); Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F.
Supp. 376, 387 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff’d, 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (holding that Missouri’s
constitutional provisions regarding religion are not facially invalid).
4
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 633 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-577).
5
Id. at 782.
2
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Missouri Constitution,6 and that the district court properly refused to grant
permission for the plaintiff to amend its complaint.7 Although the Eighth
Circuit’s ruling reflects the Supreme Court’s current First Amendment
jurisprudence, Trinity Church raises social justice concerns because of its
potential effects on religious freedom in the United States.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (“Trinity Church”) in
Columbia, Missouri, operates a preschool and day care center known as the
Learning Center.8 Although the Learning Center uses an open admissions policy,
religious instruction constitutes a daily part of the school’s curriculum.9 In 2012,
Trinity Church applied to the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
(“DNR”) for a grant to provide funding to repair the Learning Center’s
playground.10 In May 2012, a state official denied the grant to Trinity Church and
stated that providing grant money for use by Trinity Church would violate Article
I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.11 The DNR denied the application
despite the fact that Trinity Church’s application ranked fifth out of forty
applications and even though the DNR previously provided grants to fourteen
other religiously-affiliated institutions.12
Subsequently, Trinity Church filed suit against Sara Pauley, acting as the
Director of the DNR, in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri.13 Trinity Church asserted federal question jurisdiction over its claims
that the denial of the grant by the DNR violated (1) the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, (2) the Free Exercise Clause, (3) the Establishment
Clause, and (4) Trinity Church’s right to free speech under the First
Amendment.14 Trinity Church also asserted a state law claim under the court’s
supplemental jurisdiction by alleging that the DNR’s denial of the grant violated
Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.15
Director Pauley moved to dismiss Trinity Church’s complaint for failure to
state a claim.16 The district court granted Director Pauley’s motion and held that
the DNR violated neither the United States Constitution nor the Missouri

6

Id. at 783-88.
Id. at 788-90.
8
Id. at 781.
9
Id. at 782.
10
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 782.
11
Id. The program for which Trinity Church applied provides money to qualifying organizations
to resurface playgrounds with recycled tires. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 260.335.1,
260.273.6(2) (2015)).
7

12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 782.
13
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Constitution.17 Trinity Church subsequently moved for reconsideration and for
leave to amend its complaint to allege additional facts.18 Specifically, Trinity
Church wanted to allege that the DNR previously provided grants to other
religious institutions.19 The court denied the motions because Trinity Church
waited until after dismissal to make its request.20 Moreover, the court explicitly
stated that Trinity Church’s proposed amendment lacked merit because, although
Trinity Church stated that the amendment attacked “Missouri’s purported
interest,” Trinity Church failed to allege any law that required a showing of the
existence of a compelling state interest.21
Trinity Church appealed the district court’s decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.22 Specifically, Trinity Church appealed
all determinations made by the district court other than its dismissal of the
freedom of speech claim.23 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
court affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri.24
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Trinity Church’s Federal Constitutional Claims

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first examined Trinity
Church’s federal constitutional claims. Because Trinity Church asserted its First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims based upon alleged disparate
treatment based on religion, the court concluded that Trinity Church lodged a
facial attack on the validity of Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.25
Specifically, Trinity Church argued that Missouri’s Establishment Clause violated
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by barring the grant of public funds to churches.26
To determine whether the Missouri Constitution violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, the court examined past precedent.27 In Luetkemeyer v.
Kauffmann, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri28 and concluded that
17

Id.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 782.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 781.
25
Id. at 783.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 784-85.
28
Trinity, 788 F.3d. at 784 (quoting Luetkemeyer, 419 U.S. at 888). Although the Supreme Court
in Luetkemeyer summarily affirmed the judgment of the lower court, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court decided in that case that Article I, Section 7 of the
Missouri Constitution was not facially invalid. Id.
18
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Missouri’s stricter Establishment Clause served a compelling state interest and
was therefore constitutionally permissible.29 Because of the Court’s ruling in
Luetkemeyer, the court concluded that past precedent already established the
constitutional validity of Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.30
After establishing the permissibility of Missouri’s Establishment Clause,
the court reviewed Trinity Church’s request for injunctive relief to compel the
State of Missouri to provide public grants to churches in direct opposition to the
Missouri Constitution.31 The court looked to Locke v. Davey for guidance, in
which the Court upheld Washington’s constitutional provisions and laws that
barred public scholarship funds to students pursuing theology degrees.32 In Locke,
government funds from the State of Washington did not directly fund religious
instruction, but were instead “broken by the independent and private choice of
recipients.”33 The court noted that Trinity Church, in contrast to the facts in
Locke, sought to compel the State of Missouri to provide the public grant money
directly to the church.34 Accordingly, the court concluded that Locke reinforced
the Court’s decision in Luetkemeyer and therefore provided further precedent
demonstrating the validity of Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.35
Moreover, the Court declined to adopt the views expressed in the
dissenting opinion in Locke.36 In regard to the facts in Locke, Justice Scalia wrote
that if a “[s]tate makes a public benefit generally available . . . and . . . the State
withholds that benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it
violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.”37
Although the Eighth Circuit noted that the dissent’s views mirror some recent
constitutional jurisprudence, the court ultimately concluded that the Supreme
Court must determine itself whether to overrule precedent established under
Luetkemeyer and Locke.38
B.

Trinity Church’s Missouri Constitutional Claims

After examining the federal constitutional claims, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed Trinity Church’s claims under the Missouri Constitution.39
Specifically, the court examined whether the DNR’s denial of Trinity Church’s
grant violated the second clause of Article I, Section 7, which forbids
discrimination against any church.40 Because of past precedent in Missouri, the
29

Id. (quoting Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 386).
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 785 (citing Locke, 540 U.S. at 722).
33
Id. (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 719, 722).
34
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 785.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Locke, 540 U.S. at 726-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 785.
39
Id. at 786-88.
40
Id. at 786.
30
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court first noted that the two clauses of Article I, Section 7 must be interpreted in
harmony.41
After noting that Missouri’s law requires interpreting constitutional
clauses harmoniously, the court determined that the primary state constitutional
issue on review was whether granting Trinity Church’s application would
constitute the “aid” barred under the first clause of Article I, Section 7.42 As the
court reasoned, if the grant constituted aid under clause one of Article I, Section
7, denying the grant could not constitute religious discrimination under the second
clause if the two provisions of the Missouri Constitution were construed in
harmony.43 Thus, denying a grant that constituted aid did not violate Trinity
Church’s rights.44 Although Trinity Church also argued that Missouri court
precedent established a “quid pro quo” exception to Article I, Section 7’s
definition of “aid,” the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s
determination that Trinity Church “grossly misinterpreted” decisions of the
Missouri Supreme Court.45 Instead, the court noted that the Missouri Supreme
Court consistently interpreted the provisions of Article I, Section 7 of the
Missouri Constitution strictly to generally forbid the use of state money by
religious institutions.46
C.

Trinity Church’s Motion to Amend

Finally, after reviewing the district court’s constitutional determinations, the
court then examined whether the district court abused its discretion by denying
Trinity Church’s motion to amend its complaint to add an additional disparate
treatment claim and a factual allegation that other religious institutions received
similar grants.47 The court first noted that the Eighth Circuit consistently holds
that delay when moving to amend complaints, without justification, is generally
disfavored.48 Because Trinity Church could obtain information regarding the
DNR’s distribution of grants to other religious institutions from an easily
accessible government website, the court stated that Trinity Church could have
included that information in its initial complaint.49 Accordingly, the Eighth
Circuit held that the district court did not err by concluding that Trinity Church
lacked a justifiable reason for failing to amend its complaint before dismissal.50
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 787 (citing Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1976) (declining to adopt
the quid pro quo exception), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)).
46
Id. (quoting Rogers, 538 S.W.2d at 720).
47
Id. at 788-90.
48
Id. at 788 (citing United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 752 F.3d 737, 743-44 (8th Cir.
2014), In re Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010), U.S. ex rel Roop v. Hypoguard USA,
Inc., 559 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2009)).
49
Id.
50
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 788.
42
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The court then reviewed the district court’s alternative ruling that Trinity
Church’s proposed amendment was “futile.”51 Because Trinity Church did not
attempt to alter its First Amendment causes of action, the court noted that the
proposed amendment instead alleged a new, distinct disparate treatment claim.52
Although the additional facts that Trinity Church sought to allege lacked merit for
some of its causes of action, the allegation that the DNR denied grant money to
Trinity Church while giving money to other religious organizations, if intentional,
would violate the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution.53
Thus, Trinity Church’s proposed amendment, far from being futile, actually
enhanced the overall status of Trinity Church’s lawsuit.54
The court concluded, however, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying leave for two reasons. First, the court noted that district
courts generally do not abuse their discretion by denying motions to amend after
summary judgment if litigants do not present compelling excuses.55 Second,
allowing Trinity Church to amend its complaint would change the “procedural
landscape” of the case.56 Specifically, the proposed amendments would add an
additional disparate treatment theory that would require the district court to
determine issues of state law—an addition that would trigger the need for
Pullman abstention by the court.57 Moreover, the new theory would raise
significant venue and jurisdiction issues under Missouri law.58
IV.

CONCLUSION

Trinity demonstrates that, under current federal constitutional
jurisprudence, state governments can legally deny benefits to religious
organizations because of religious affiliation, even if the state grants money to
other religiously-affiliated institutions. In other words, the holding by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Trinity allows for disparate treatment of religious
organizations and their members based upon state constitutional provisions.
Unless the Supreme Court intervenes and overturns past precedent, religious
organizations in states with strict establishment clauses may continue to
experience disparate treatment simply because of religious affiliation—a result
that differs radically from commonly held notions of social justice.

51

Id.
Id. at 788-89.
53
Id. at 789 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982)).
54
Id.
55
Id. (quoting Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1986)).
56
Trinity, 788 F.3d at 789.
57
Id. (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)).
58
Id. at 790 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 536.010 et seq).
52

